We introduce updatable anonymous credential systems (UACS) and use them to construct a new privacy-preserving incentive system. In a UACS, a user holding a credential certifying some attributes can interact with the corresponding issuer to update his attributes. During this, the issuer knows which update function is run, but does not learn the user's previous attributes. Hence the update process preserves anonymity of the user. One example for a class of update functions are additive updates of integer attributes, where the issuer increments an unknown integer attribute value v by some known value k. This kind of update is motivated by an application of UACS to incentive systems. Users in an incentive system can anonymously accumulate points, e.g. in a shop at checkout, and spend them later, e.g. for a discount.
INTRODUCTION
Updatable anonymous credential systems. Anonymous credential systems provide a privacy-preserving way of authentication in contrast to the standard authentication through identification via username and password. Authentication with identifying information allows service providers to collect and exchange user-specific data to build a comprehensive user profile without the user's consent. Anonymous credentials mitigate such problems, provide anonymity, and support authentication policies [2, 3, 10, 11, 15] . A credential is parameterized with a vector of attributes (e.g., birth date, affiliation, subscription_end) and when authenticating, users can prove possession of a credential that fulfills a certain access policy (e.g., "affiliation = university or subscription_end > [today]") without revealing anything about the attributes except that they fulfill the access policy.
While authentication is perfectly anonymous in an anonymous credential system, the issuer of a credential always learns the credentials' plaintext attributes. Suppose that a user wants to extend a subscription for which she has a credential as described above. To extend the subscription in a traditional anonymous credential system, she would reveal all her attribute values to the issuer, who would then issue a new credential containing her old attributes and the newly updated subscription_end value. This means that updating attributes is not privacy-preserving.
To solve this problem, we introduce updatable anonymous credential systems (UACS). A UACS has, in addition to the usual (issue and show) protocols of anonymous credential systems, an update protocol. This allows a user to interact with a credential issuer in order to update attributes in a privacy-preserving manner. More specifically, the update protocol takes as input an update function ψ . The user contributes a hidden parameter α and her old credential with attributes ì A. By running the protocol with the issuer, the user obtains a new credential on attributes ì A * = ψ ( ì A, α). The issuer only learns what update function ψ is applied, but does not learn ì A or α. In the subscription update scenario, to add 30 days to the current subscription_end, the update function would be defined as ψ ((A, subscription_end), α) = (A, subscription_end + 30). In this particular case, the hidden parameter α is ignored by ψ , but we will later see update functions that depend on α, e.g. to issue hidden attributes.
The update protocol can be efficiently realized using only building blocks already used by most anonymous credential constructions: Zero-knowledge proofs, commitments, and blind signature schemes with efficient "signing a committed value" protocols.
The idea to implement the UACS update protocol between a user and issuer is as follows: A user's credential on attributes ì A is a digital signature on ì A by the issuer. The user prepares the update by computing her updated attributes ì A * = ψ ( ì A, α) and committing to ì A * . The user then proves that she possesses a valid signature on her old attributes ì A under the public key of the issuer and that she knows α such that the commitment can be opened to ψ ( ì A, α). Afterwards, issuer and user run a blind signature protocol to jointly compute a signature on the committed ì A * (i.e. the updated attributes) without revealing ì A * to the issuer. The lack of privacy-preserving updates (as explained above) limits the usefulness of anonymous credentials in several practical applications, such as service subscription management and point collection. In such applications, attributes (such as the subscription end or collected point total) are routinely updated and users would prefer not to be tracked through these updates. As a specific example of what UACS enables, we look at incentive systems, which is essentially a point collection application.
Incentive systems. An incentive system allows users to collect points (e.g., for every purchase they make), which they can redeem for bonus items or discounts. Such systems aim at reinforcing customer loyalty and incentivize certain behavior through points. In practice, such systems are centralized services, e.g. German Payback [22] and American Express Membership Rewards program [1] . In order to earn points for a purchase, the user reveals her customer ID (e.g., by showing a card). This means that the user's privacy is not protected as every purchase made can be linked to the user's identity by the incentive system provider.
To remedy this, cryptographic incentive systems [18] [19] [20] aim at allowing users to earn and spend points anonymously. The general idea is that users store their own points in authenticated form (e.g., in the form of a credential).
We would expect a cryptographic incentive system to offer the following features.
• Anonymity: Providers are unable to link earn/spend transactions to users. In practice, this protects users from having their shopping history linked to their identity and point values. • Online double-spending protection: A user cannot spend more points than they have earned. Given continuous access to a central database, the provider can immediately detect double-spending. • Offline double-spending protection: Detecting double-spending works for stores without continuous access to a central database. Double-spending transactions can be detected and the perpetrating user can be identified. Losses incurred by double-spending can be reclaimed from that user. • Partial spending: Users do not have to spend all of their points at once.
• Efficiency: The process of earning and spending points can be run on a consumer phone and is fast enough to be accepted by users.
The current state of the art either does not have offline doublespending protection, or does not handle the combination of partial spending and offline double-spending securely. Our system will offer all of these features simultaneously.
We will now explain our UACS-based incentive system by constructing it step by step. As a first sketch, let us assume that the user stores her point count v as an attribute in her credential. When the user earns k additional points, the incentive system provider runs an update on the user's credential, adding k points to her current point count attribute v, i.e. they use update function ψ ((v), α) = (v + k). When the user wants to (partially) spend k ≤ v points, they run an update ψ such that ψ ((v), α) = v − k if v ≥ k and ψ ((v), α) =⊥ otherwise.
Of course, this first sketch does not prevent users from doublespending their points: the spend update operation creates a new credential with lowered point count, but there is no mechanism that forces the user to use the new credential. She can instead keep using the old one, which certifies a higher point count. Hence we modify the first sketch with basic online double-spending protection: The attributes now include a random double-spend identifier dsid, i.e. attribute vectors are of the form ì A = (dsid, v). To earn points, the update function still just increases the point count (ψ ((dsid, v), α) = (dsid, v + k)). When the user wants to spend points, she reveals her dsid to the provider and the provider checks that her specific dsid has never been revealed to it (spent) before. If that check succeeds, the user chooses a random successor double-spend identifier dsid * and sets her hidden update parameter α to dsid * . Finally, user and provider run the update ψ ((dsid, v), α = dsid * ) = (dsid * , v − k), embedding a new dsid * into the successor credential. If the user tries to spend her old credential (with the old dsid) again, the provider will detect the duplicate dsid. Anonymity is still preserved because dsid * is hidden from the provider until the credential is spent.
However, this approach requires all stores where points can be spent to be permanently online in order to check whether a given dsid has already been spent. As this is a problem in practice, offline double-spending protection is desirable. The idea is that stores that are offline and have an incomplete list of spent dsids may incorrectly accept a spend transaction, but they can later (when they are online again) uncover the identities of double spenders. This allows the provider to recoup any losses due to offline double-spending by pursuing a legal solution to roll back illegal transactions. To incorporate offline double-spending protection, we additionally embed a user's secret key usk and a random value dsrnd into credentials, i.e. attributes are now ì A = (usk, dsid, dsrnd, v). The update function to earn points is unchanged. To spend points, the provider now sends a random challenge γ to the user and the user reveals c = usk · γ + dsrnd mod p (where usk, dsrnd are values from her credential attributes). The user chooses new hidden random dsid * , dsrnd * for its successor credential and then runs the update for ψ ((usk, dsid, dsrnd, v), α = (dsid * , dsrnd * )) = (usk, dsid * , dsrnd * , v − k). As long as a credential is only spent once, usk is perfectly hidden in c. If the user tries to spend the same credential a second time, revealing c ′ = usk · γ ′ + dsrnd mod p for some different challenge γ ′ , the provider can compute usk from c, c ′ , γ , γ ′ , identifying the double-spender.
This last description comes close to the scheme we present in this paper. However, one problem remains to handle: assume some user double-spends a credential on attributes (usk, dsid, dsrnd, v). For both spend transaction, she receives a remainder amount credential as the successor with attributes ì A * = (usk, dsid * , dsrnd * , v − k). While both transactions will be detected as double spending and the user's key is revealed, the user can keep using both remainder amount credentials anonymously, allowing her to spend 2·(v −k) > v points. To prevent this, we need a mechanism that allows us to recognize remainder amount credentials that were derived from double-spending transactions. This can be achieved by forcing the user to reveal an encryption ctrace of dsid * under usk when spending points. As soon as a user double-spends, the provider can compute usk as above. With it, he can decrypt all ctrace for that user, allowing him to find out what dsids have been derived from doublespending transactions of the double-spending user. Consequently, the user can be held accountable for spending remainder tokens derived from double-spending transactions.
Related work on anonymous credential systems. There is a large body of work on anonymous credential systems, extending the basic constructions [2, 10, 11, 23] with additional features such as revocation [9, 10] , controlled linkability and advanced policy classes [3] , hidden policies [15] , delegation [4, 7] , and many others. Our notion of privacy-preserving updates on credentials, in its generality, is a new feature (although the general idea of privacy-preserving updates has been briefly sketched before [21] ). We show how to efficiently extend the standard blind-signature-based construction of anonymous credentials with updates, which makes our update mechanism compatible with a large part of features presented in existing work (with the exception of [15] , which does not rely on blind signatures).
The scheme in [9] allows issuers to non-interactively update credentials they have issued. In contrast to our updatable credentials, their update cannot depend on hidden attributes and the issuer learns all attributes issued or updated. Their update mechanism is mostly aimed at providing an efficient means to update revocation information, which is controlled by the issuer. Updatable credentials in the sense of our paper allow for the functionality in [9] as well (although in our system, updates are done interactively between user and issuer). However, beyond that, our updates can depend on hidden attributes of the user and the issuer does not learn the attributes resulting from the update.
More technically similar to our updatable credential mechanism are stateful anonymous credentials [12, 16] . A stateful credential contains a state. The user can have his credential state updated to some successor state as prescribed by a public state machine model. For this, the user does not have to disclose his current credential state. Such a state transition is a special case of an update to a state attribute in an updatable credential. In this sense, our construction of updatable credentials generalizes the work of [12] .
Related work on incentive systems. Existing e-cash systems are related to incentive systems, but pursue different security goals [8] . E-cash does not support the accumulation of points within a single token. Instead, each token corresponds to a coin and can be identified. To spend a coin, a user transfers it to another owner. In incentive systems, a number of points is accumulated into a single token (i.e. the token is like a bank account rather than a coin).
A cryptographic scheme that considers the collection of points in a practical scenario is described by Milutinovic et al. in [20] . Their scheme uCentive can be seen as a special e-cash system, where a so called uCent corresponds to a point. The user stores and spends all uCents individually, which induces storage and communication cost linear in the number of uCents (hence efficiency is restricted). Similar to our system, uCentive builds upon anonymous credentials (but without updates) and commitments, but they do not offer offline double-spending protection.
Jager and Rupp [19] introduce black-box accumulation (BBA) as a building-block for incentive systems. They formalize the core functionality and security of such systems based on the natural requirement that users collect and sum up values in a privacypreserving way. In detail, they present a generic construction of BBA combining homomorphic commitments, digital signatures, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (Goth-Sahai proofs [17] ). The BBA solution has three major shortcomings: the token creation and redemption processes are linkable, users have to redeem all of their points at once, and stores must be permanently online to detect double-spending.
Hartung et al. [18] present an improved framework of black-box accumulation (BBA+) based on the framework introduced in [19] . In [18] , BBA is extended with offline double-spending prevention (on which we base our offline double-spending mechanism) and other desirable features. Because of efficiency reasons, users needs to reveal their point count whenever they spend points. Their efficiency problems mainly stem from the use of Groth-Sahai proofs. Note that the use of Groth-Sahai is inherent in their approach (because their proof statements are mostly about group elements). It is unclear whether their construction can be made more efficient by exchanging the proof system without changing the approach. In contrast, our incentive system can be instantiated in a Schnorr proof setting (with proof statements mostly about discrete logarithms). Because the Schnorr setting allows for very efficient proofs [3, 6] , our incentive system is also very efficient.
What prior work does not handle is the conjunction of offlinedouble spending prevention and partial spending (even when disregarding efficiency concerns). If a spend operation is later detected as double-spending, the remainder token still remains valid in prior constructions. Our construction solves this, allowing the provider to trace all tokens derived from double-spent transactions to a user. The price of this solution is forward and backward privacy as defined in [18] , which our scheme does not offer.
Overall, with the UACS-based incentive system approach, we improve upon the current state-of-the-art [18] (from 2017 ACM CCS) in two ways: (1) efficiency (mostly because our approach allows us to avoid Groth-Sahai proofs), and (2) we enable the combination of offline double-spending prevention and partial spending. It is an interesting open question whether or not our remainder token tracing mechanism can be combined with forward and backward privacy as in [18] .
A basic version of the idea of using updates on credentials for incentive systems has been informally considered in a 2005 technical report [14] before.
Our contribution and structure of this paper. We introduce UACS formally in Section 3 and define its security properties. In Section 4, we construct UACS generically from blind signature schemes and in Section 5, we sketch how to efficiently instantiate UACS using the generic framework. We define formal requirements for incentive systems in Section 6, modeling our double-spend prevention mechanism and defining security. In Section 7, we construct an incentive system from a UACS. Finally, we practically evaluate our incentive system in Section 8.
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, we refer to a public-parameter generation ppt G that outputs public parameters pp given unary security parameter 1 λ . We write output A [A ↔ B] for interactive algorithms A, B to denote the output of A after interacting with B. The support of a probabilistic algorithm A on input x is denoted by
denotes a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge protocol where the prover proves knowledge of w such that (x, w) is in some NP relation R. The zero-knowledge argument of knowledge can be simulated perfectly given a trapdoor [13] and there exists an expected polynomial-time extractor that, given black-box access to a successful prover, computes a witness w with probability 1 [13] .
We define security with an oracle-based notation, where an adversary A gets oracle access to some methods or protocols. Some oracles are interactive, i.e. they may send and receive messages during a call. We distinguish between the oracle's (local) output, which is generally given to the adversary, and the oracle's sent and received messages. The notation Oracle(·) denotes that A chooses x, then oracle Oracle(x) is run interacting with A. A is given the output of the oracle (if any). The notation (x, y) → Oracle 0 (x) ↔ Oracle 1 (y) denotes that the adversary A chooses inputs x, y, then Oracle 0 (x) ↔ Oracle 1 (y) are run, interacting with one another. A is given the output of both oracles, but not the messages sent or received by the oracles.
For blind signatures, we require that the blind signing protocol is of the form "commit to the message(s) to sign, then jointly compute the signature". As such, we model the commitment step and the "receive a signature on the committed value" step separately. Definition 2.1. A blind signature scheme for signing committed values Π sig consists of the following (ppt) algorithms:
KeyGen sig (pp, 1 n ) → (pk, sk) generates a key pair (pk, sk) for signatures on vectors of n messages. Commit sig (pp, pk, ì m, r ) → c given messages ì m ∈ M n and randomness r , deterministically computes a commitment c. BlindSign sig (pp, pk, sk, c) ↔ BlindRcv sig (pp, pk, ì m, r ) → σ with common input pp, pk is an interactive protocol. The signer's input is sk, c. The receiver's input consists of the messages ì m and commitment randomness r . The receiver outputs a signature σ . Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì m, σ ) → b deterministically checks signature σ and outputs 0 or 1.
A blind signature scheme is correct if for all λ, n ∈ N and all pp ∈ [G(1 λ )], (pk, sk) ∈ [KeyGen sig (pp, 1 n )], all ì m ∈ M n , and for all r , Pr[BlindSign sig (pp, pk, sk, Commit sig (pp, pk, ì m, r )) ↔ BlindRcv sig (pp, pk, ì m, r ) → σ :
We require for a blind signature scheme unforgeability and perfect message privacy, cf. Appendix A, Definitions A.1 and A.2. Definition 2.1 can be instantiated by Pointcheval Sanders signatures [23] .
We furthermore need public-key encryption with the property that the key generation KeyGen enc first generates a secret key sk, from which the corresponding public key pk = ComputePK(pp, sk) can be deterministically computed. For example, for ElGamal encryption with fixed base д, we have that sk ← Z p and the public key is ComputePK(pp, sk) = д sk . For the sake of privacy in our constructions, we will later demand key-indistinguishable CPA security. This notion requires that, in addition to CPA-security, ciphertexts cannot be linked to their public key (cf. Appendix A, Definition A.3). This is the case for ElGamal encryption. Finally, we use an additively malleable commitment scheme. We require the commitment to be perfectly binding and computationally hiding, cf. Appendix A, Definitions A.4 and A.5. Definition 2.3 can be instantiated by ElGamal encryption.
UPDATABLE ANONYMOUS CREDENTIALS
In UACS, there are three roles: issuers, users, and verifiers. Each role can be instantiated arbitrarily many times. Issuers hold keys to issue credentials to users. Credentials are certificates that are parameterized with attributes. Users can prove possession of a credential to verifiers. Users can interact with their credential's issuer to change its attributes.
Algorithms of UACS
A UACS consists of ppt algorithms Setup, IssuerKeyGen, and interactive protocols Issue ↔ Receive, Update ↔ UpdRcv, and ShowPrv ↔ ShowVrfy. We explain them in the following:
Setup. We assume that some trusted party has already generated public parameters pp ← G(1 λ ). pp may, for example, contain a description of a group, which can also be used for any number of other cryptographic applications. To set up a UACS, a trusted party generates UACS-specific parameters cpp ← Setup(pp). cpp may, for example, contain pp and parameters for a zero-knowledge proof system. The distinction between G and Setup is made to enable formal compatibility of UACS with other primitives, as long as they use the same pp. cpp is published and we assume that an attribute universe A is encoded in cpp (e.g., A = Z p ).
Key generation. Whenever a new issuer wants to participate in the UACS, he first chooses an attribute vector length n ∈ N and then generates a key pair (pk, sk) ← IssuerKeyGen(cpp, 1 n ). The secret key sk will be used to issue and update credentials, the public key pk will be used to identify the issuer and to verify credentials issued by him. Credentials by this issuer will be parameterized with a vector ì A ∈ A n . In a UACS, users do not generally need keys. This is in contrast to the usual definitions of anonymous credentials, in which users explicitly generate a secret identity. We generalize that approach for UACS and leave the implementation of user identities to the application, if desired (see Section 3.3).
Issuing and updating credentials. Users have two ways to receive new credentials: receive a fresh credential from an issuer, or update an old one.
Assume the user holds a credential cred with attributes ì A and wants to update it. User and issuer first agree on an update function ψ : A n ×{0, 1} * → A n ∪{⊥}, and the user secretly chooses a hidden parameter α s.t. ψ ( ì A, α) ⊥. The issuer and user then engage in an interactive protocol: the issuer runs Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) while the user runs UpdRcv(cpp, pk,ψ , α, cred). Afterwards, UpdRcv outputs a new credential cred * with attributes ì A * = ψ ( ì A, α) or the failure symbol (e.g., if ψ ( ì A, α) =⊥). Furthermore, Update outputs a bit b to the issuer, which informally serves as an indicator whether or not the update was successful. In particular b = 1 guarantees that ψ ( ì A, α) ⊥. This effectively means that, with an appropriately chosen ψ , a credential update implicitly includes a check of the old credential's attributes.
We model issuing a new credential essentially as an update of an "empty" credential: User and issuer first agree on an update function ψ : {⊥} × {0, 1} * → A n ∪ {⊥}, and the user secretly chooses a hidden parameter α s.t. ψ (⊥, α) ⊥. Then the issuer runs Issue(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) while the user runs Receive(cpp, pk,ψ , α). Afterwards, Receive outputs a credential cred with attributes ì A = ψ (⊥, α) or the failure symbol (e.g., if ψ (⊥, α) =⊥).
In contrast to the usual definition of anonymous credentials, the issuer does not necessarily know the exact attributes he is issuing (he does not know the input to the update function ψ ). To issue attributes ì
A fully known to the issuer, the update function ψ can be set to ψ (⊥, α) = ì A (i.e. ψ ignores α and outputs a constant). An example for an update function hiding some attributes from the issuer is ψ (⊥, α = (a, b)) = (0, a, b, a + b), where the user's first attribute would be 0 (which the issuer knows), but the user may freely choose a, b. To restrict the user's choice of α, the update
Showing credentials. To prove possession of a credential cred with attributes ì A from some issuer with public key pk, the user and the verifier first agree on a predicate ϕ : A n × {0, 1} * → {0, 1}. The user chooses a hidden parameter α such that ϕ( ì A, α) = 1. Then the user runs ShowPrv(cpp, pk, ϕ, α, cred), interacting with the verifier running ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ). Afterwards, ShowVrfy outputs a bit b. If b = 1, the verifier knows that the user possesses a credential,
Formal definition. We now formally define UACS. First, we need the notion of valid credentials: the predicate ValidCred(cpp, pk, cred, ì A) defines whether cred is considered a valid credential with attributes ì A for issuer pk under UACS public parameters cpp. Intuitively, we want all credentials output by Receive and UpdRcv to be valid with the attributes the user expects. Formally, ValidCred(cpp, pk, cred, ì A) is recursively defined as follows:
In all other cases, ValidCred(. . . ) = 0. ValidCred is not necessarily efficiently computable, but serves a purpose in our definitions.
Definition 3.1 (Updatable anonymous credential system). An updatable anonymous credential system Π uacs (UACS) consists of the ppt algorithms Setup, IssuerKeyGen, Issue, Receive, Update, UpdRcv, ShowPrv, and ShowVrfy. Let Φ be a set of supported predicates ϕ, and let Ψ be a set of supported update functions ψ (Φ and Ψ may depend on cpp and pk). A UACS is correct, if whenever ValidCred((cpp, pk, ì A, cred)) = 1:
• if ϕ ∈ Φ and ϕ( ì A, α) = 1, then ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ) accepts after interacting with ShowPrv(cpp, pk, ϕ, α, cred).
• if ψ ∈ Ψ, α ∈ {0, 1} * and ψ ( ì A, α) ⊥, then after interacting with one another, Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) outputs 1, and UpdRcv(cpp, pk,ψ , α, cred) does not output ⊥. ⋄
Security of UACS
On a high level, a UACS has two security goals: (1) Anonymity: honest users' privacy should be protected (even against malicious issuers and verifiers), meaning that user actions should be unlinkable and hide as much data as possible. (2) Soundness: malicious users should not be able to show or update a credential they have not obtained by the issuer. These are explained next.
Anonymity.
Our anonymity definition follows a simulation approach. This means that we require existence of simulators that can simulate the user's role of the show, issue, and update protocols. For this, the input for the simulators is exactly the information that the issuer/verifier should learn from the interaction (plus a trapdoor to enable simulation). The issuer/verifier cannot learn the user's private information because the protocols can be simulated without it, hence its transcripts effectively do not contain information about private information. This makes it easy to succinctly express exactly what the issuer/verifier learns and enables use of the UACS in larger contexts (for example, for our incentive system, an indistinguishability definition would not suffice). More specifically, for an anonymous UACS, there exists an efficient algorithm S Setup (pp) that outputs cpp (like Setup) and a simulation trapdoor td. Then the following simulators simulate a user's protocols: S Receive (td, pk,ψ ) simulates receiving a credential (note that this means that the issuer learns only ψ , but not α). S UpdRcv (td, pk,ψ ) simulates having a credential updated (meaning the issuer only learns ψ , but not α or the old attributes ì A, nor any information about the specific credential-to-be-updated). Finally, S ShowPrv (td, pk, ϕ) simulates showing a credential (the verifier only learns ϕ, not ì A or α). In the real world, the issuer will usually learn whether or not a credential issuing or update has worked, meaning whether or not the user's protocol side outputs a non-error value ⊥ (e.g., because the user would immediately ask to run failed protocols again). To make sure that the issuer cannot learn anything from this bit of information, we make this part of the simulation: S Receive actually simulates a protocol Receive ′ , which behaves like Receive, but after the interaction sends a bit b to the issuer, indicating whether or not Receive outputs the error symbol or a credential. Analogously, S UpdRcv simulates UpdRcv ′ . The soundness definition is game-based: an adversary A is run through an experiment (cf. Figure 1) . The experiment simulates an honest issuer and honest verifier. A can ask to be issued credentials, to have them updated, or to show them, choosing the update functions ψ and show-predicates ϕ that the issuer/verifier shall use. Eventually, A halts. Now, to judge whether or not A won, the experiment runs an extractor E (whose existence we require from sound UACS). E outputs an explanation list L, which conjectures what hidden parameters A used in each issue/update/verify protocol. If E fails to produce an explanation list L that is consistent with what we've observed during the experiment, then A wins. Consistency mainly hinges on the bit output by ShowVrfy and Update: If ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ) outputs 1, then we expect that L shows a series of issue/update operations that explains why A possesses a credential with attributes ì A for which there exists an α
then L should show that A has a credential with attributes ì A for which there exists an α with ψ ( ì A, α) ⊥. Formally, an explanation list L contains one entry per operation that A requested during the experiment.
• For ShowVrfy or Update operations, the ith entry is a tuple ( ì A i , α i ). • For Issue operations, the entry is some hidden parameter α i .
These entries naturally induce sets E i of attribute vectors that we expect A to have after the ith operation. Initially, E 0 = ∅. Then inductively:
• if the ith operation is ShowVrfy, no credentials are issued,
• if the ith operation is Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) (and Update output 1), we expect A to now have a credential with attributes
If Update output 0, we expect no new credential to have been issued, i.e. E i = E i−1 .
We say that an explanation list L is consistent if it explains all the instances where ShowVrfy or Update output 1:
• if the ith operation was ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ) with output 1, then the list's ( ì A i , α i ) fulfills ϕ (i.e. ϕ( ì A i , α i ) = 1) and ì A i is the result of an earlier issue/update operation (i.e. ì A i ∈ E i−1 ). • if the ith operation was Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) with output 1, then the list's ( ì
the result of an earlier issue/update operation (i.e. ì A i ∈ E i−1 ).
Definition 3.3 (Soundness).
We say that Π is sound if there exists an expected polynomial time algorithm E (probability for runtime is over A's randomness r A and E's randomness), such that for all ppt adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl with
A few technical notes: the randomness r A , r Issue , r Update , and r ShowVrfy together with oracle access to A can be used by E to effectively re-run the experiment exactly as it happened before. It can then use, for example, forking techniques to extract relevant witnesses from A. The requirement that E must be efficient (expected polynomial time) is somewhat arbitrary at this point: the definition would still make sense if E's runtime were unrestricted, since E is just a way to express that there must exist a consistent Exp sound (Π, A, E, λ):
cpp ← Setup(G(1 λ )), (1 n , st) ← A(cpp), for some n ∈ N (pk, sk) ← IssuerKeyGen(cpp, 1 n )
Run A Issue(cpp,pk,·,sk),Update(cpp,pk,·,sk),ShowVrfy(cpp,pk,·) (pk, st)
Let r A be the randomness of A Let r Issue , r Update , r ShowVrfy be the oracles' randomness.
Run L ← E A (cpp, r A , r Issue , r Update , r ShowVrfy ).
Output 0 if L is consistent, otherwise output 1 Figure 1 : Soundness experiment for UACS explanation. However, for constructions that use UACS as a primitive (such as in Section 3.3 and in our incentive system later), E must often be efficient so that an efficient reduction can run E to obtain A's hidden values. This effectively implies that in a sound UACS, A must know (in the sense of an argument of knowledge) the values ì A, α it uses for issue/update/show.
A Note on User Secrets and Pseudonyms
Usually, users in a credential system have a personal key usk that is embedded in their credentials. They can derive any number of unlinkable pseudonyms N from usk. UACS generalize this: usk and pseudonyms are not immediate part of the definition, but because UACS naturally supports hidden attribute issuing, usk can be seen as just another UACS attribute.
To implement user keys and pseudonyms in UACS, one can use the following template: The user chooses usk randomly from a superpolynomial-size domain. Pseudonyms N are commitments to usk, i.e. (N , o) ← Commit(pp, pk, usk). The user privately stores the open value o for the pseudonym.
Assume the user identified himself with the pseudonym N . To receive a credential on attributes ì A, the user sets his hidden parameter to α = (usk, o) and the update function (1) checks if N opens to usk using o and then (2) embeds usk as an attribute into the credential:
This ensures that only the user who created N can receive the credential and that the usk embedded into it is consistent with N .
Similarly, show predicates ϕ can be modified such that the user supplies the additional hidden parameter α = o and ϕ additionally checks that the commitment N opens to the user secret embedded in the credential (ensuring that the credential actually belongs to the user behind N ). When updating a credential, the update function ψ should always leave the usk attribute intact.
As a technical note on security, if the commitment is computationally hiding, then simulation anonymity can be used to argue that anonymity is preserved: the protocols can be simulated without usk or o. This also motivates why we chose a simulation-based anonymity definition: a reduction to the commitment hiding property would have to embed a challenge commitment N into some UACS protocol, which it then needs to be able to simulate because without an open value, it cannot run the protocol honestly. If the commitment is computationally binding, then soundness implies that E can extract an open value o. For example, in a scenario where a user can use the same pseudonym for two different usk, a consistent explanation would contain two open values to break the binding property of the commitment. This motivates the choice of restricting the UACS extractor E to (expected) polynomial time, as otherwise, the reduction to the commitment binding property would not be efficient.
GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF UACS
An UACS can be generically constructed from any blind signature scheme Π sig = (KeyGen sig , Commit sig , BlindSign sig , BlindRcv sig ) (Definition 2.1) as follows:
Keys. The public parameters cpp of the UACS are the public parameters of Π sig plus a zero-knowledge argument common reference string (this will later allow us to simulate zero-knowledge arguments). For the issuer, IssuerKeyGen(cpp, 1 n )] generates the key pair (pk, sk) by running the blind signature scheme's key generation KeyGen sig (pp, 1 n ) to get a key for blocks of n messages.
Showing credentials. A credential cred with attributes ì
A is simply a signature σ on ì A under the issuer's pk. Showing a credential (ShowPrv(cpp, pk, ϕ, α, cred = σ ) ↔ ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ)) simply has the user run a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge
proving that he is in possession of a valid signature on hidden attributes ì A and knows α such that ϕ is satisfied. ShowVrfy outputs 1 if and only if the proof is accepted.
Updating and issuing credentials. For Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) ↔ UpdRcv(cpp, pk,ψ , α, cred), the user has a credential cred = σ , which is a signature on ì A, and wants a signature on ì A * := ψ ( ì A, α).
He computes a commitment c to ì A * . He proves that c is well-formed and that he possesses a signature σ on ì A:
If the proof is rejected, the issuer outputs 0 and aborts (this ensures that the user can only update if he possesses an old credential with ψ ( ì A, α) ⊥). Otherwise, the issuer will output 1 after the rest of the protocol. The issuer runs BlindSign sig (pp, pk, sk, c), while the user runs BlindRcv sig (pp, pk, ì A * , r ). For the user, BlindRcv sig outputs a new signature σ * . The user checks that σ * is valid signature Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì A * , σ * ) ! = 1. If so, he knows that σ * is a valid credential on his expected attributes and outputs cred * = σ * . Otherwise, he outputs ⊥. Issuing a credential (Issue(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) ↔ Receive(cpp, pk,ψ , α)) works similarly, but the user commits to ψ (⊥, α) and he omits the part about σ in the ZKAK (only proves that c is well-formed and ψ (⊥, α) ⊥).
Construction 4.1. Let Π sig be a blind signature scheme. We define an updatable credential system Π uacs as described above.
A full formal description can be found in Appendix B. The proofs of the above theorems are straight-forward reductions to the corresponding blind signature properties. They are presented in the full version of this paper [5] .
EFFICIENT INSTANTIATION OF UACS
Since there exist zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for all of NP, almost arbitrary update functions are supported by this construction. Because those generic zero-knowledge arguments are not necessarily considered practically efficient, in practice one usually wants to restrict the class of update functions. For example, a large class of statements is supported by Sigma protocols (such as generalizations of Schnorr's protocol), which are very efficient (see, for example, [3] ). The blind signature scheme by Pointcheval and Sanders [23] is a good candidate to use in conjunction with Sigma protocols. If the update function is sufficiently "simple" (i.e. the check ψ ( ì A, α) ! = ì A * can be efficiently implemented as a Sigma protocol), our construction is efficient.
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS
In an incentive system, there are two roles: users and the provider. The provider operates a point collection system in order to incentivize certain user behavior. Users gain points for certain actions (e.g., buying something), which they later want to redeem for some bonus item (e.g., a frying pan). A user privately stores his points in a token. We will usually talk about multiple users and a single provider.
Structure of an Incentive System
An incentive system Π insy consists of the following ppt algorithms Setup, KeyGen, IssuerKeyGen, Link, VrfyDs, Trace, as well as interactive protocols Issue ↔ Join, Credit ↔ Earn, and Spend ↔ Deduct. We explain them in the following.
Setup and key generation. We assume that a trusted party has already generated public parameters pp ← G(1 λ ) (like in UACS). To set up an incentive system, a trusted party generates incentivesystem-specific parameters ispp ← Setup(pp). We assume that some maximum point score v max is encoded in ispp and that this limit is large enough never to be hit in practice. To join the system, a provider runs IssuerKeyGen(ispp) to obtain a key pair (pk, sk). He publishes pk and distributes sk to all store terminals that can issue points to users (these can be, for example, distributed over multiple physical stores). For the sake of this explanation, we will distinguish the provider and individual store terminals.
When users want to join the system, they run KeyGen(ispp) and store the resulting key pair (upk, usk) (e.g., on their smartphone).
Obtaining a token. To obtain a token with balance 0 from the provider (or store terminal), the user sends his upk to the provider and identifies himself (this is out of the scope of the incentive system. For example, the user could sign upk with some signature key stored on their digital passport). The provider associates upk to the user's real identity (so that in case of dispute, the user can be identified from upk). Then, the provider runs Issue(ispp, pk, upk, sk) interacting with the user running Join(ispp, pk, upk, usk). Afterwards, Join outputs a token token and a double-spending identifier dsid to the user (these are hidden from the provider). The user stores his current token token, its current dsid and value v (for this fresh token, v = 0, i.e. no points have been collected yet). dsid can be seen as a random ID for the token, which will play a role in preventing double-spending.
Earning and spending points. After obtaining a token token from the provider, the user can start collecting points. Assume the user buys something in a store, for which he should receive k points. To grant the points, the store terminal runs Credit(ispp, pk, k, sk) interacting with the user running Earn(ispp, pk, k, usk, token). Afterwards, Earn outputs a new token token * to the user. If token * ⊥, the user deletes his old token token and replaces it with the new token token * (the dsid does not change between token and token * ). If the old token token had the value v, then the new token has value v + k.
After earning enough points, the user may want to spend some of them in exchange for some reward (e.g., spend 100 points to obtain a frying pan). For this, user and the store terminal agree on a number k ≤ v of points to spend. Then the user reveals his dsid to the store terminal. The terminal keeps a local database DB local of dsid it has already seen (more details later). If dsid is present in DB local (meaning the user is trying to spend a token that has already been spent before), the terminal rejects the transaction. Otherwise, the store terminal runs Deduct(ispp, pk, k, dsid, sk) interacting with the user running Spend(ispp, pk, k, dsid, usk, token).
Spend outputs a new token token * and a new dsid * for the new token (since the old dsid has been revealed, token * needs a new one). The new token holds the remainder amount v −k of points left after the spend operation. The user updates its current token, dsid, and v with the new values (and deletes the old values).
Deduct outputs a bit b to the terminal and, if b = 1, a doublespend tag dstag. If b = 0, the transaction has failed (e.g., the user does not have enough points). In that case, the store terminal does nothing. If b = 1, the transaction is considered successful and the reward is given to the user. The terminal stores the transaction data together with dsid and dstag in its local database DB local . This data will be used to handle offline double-spending.
Handling offline double-spending. Because the local databases DB local of each store are not necessarily in sync (stores are not required to be always online), users can (potentially) spend the same token in two offline stores. This is because if the first store is offline, it cannot (in time) communicate to the second store that the token's dsid has already been spent. This way, the user may receive rewards for which he does not have sufficient points.
To deal with this, an incentive system offers the following mechanism: assume there was a spend transaction t in which a user spends his token. Associated with t are the token's id dsid and a tag dstag (as described above). If there is another spend transactions t × that is associated with the same dsid and some tag dstag × , then double spending occurred. t × should be considered invalid and the provider should try to undo all consequences of t × . To undo rewards gained fraudulently by the user as the result of t × , the provider would first run the algorithm Link(ispp, dstag, dstag × ), which outputs (1) the double-spending user's public key upk, and (2) linking information dslink. With upk, the provider can identify the user, while dslink serves as publicly verifiable proof that the user has indeed double-spent. This can be verified by anyone using VrfyDs(ispp, dslink, upk), which outputs a bit indicating whether or not dslink is a valid proof of double-spending for user upk. With this mechanism, the provider can recoup any losses (e.g., through a legal process).
The second consequence of transaction t × is that the user gained a remainder token from it, which also never should have happened. dslink as computed above can also be used to deal with this: the incentive system provides the method Trace(ispp, dslink, dstag × ) which outputs the dsid of the remainder token that resulted from t × . This can be iterated: if Trace(ispp, dslink, dstag × ) uncovers dsid 0 and dsid 0 has also been already spent in transaction t 0 with tag dstag 0 , then Trace(ispp, dslink, dstag 0 ) will uncover some dsid 1 , etc.
To be more concrete, we imagine the provider sets up a central database DB. The database is a directed bipartite graph, which contains (1) one token node dsid for each dsid the provider received, and (2) one transaction node t i for each spend transaction. Edges establish known consume/produce relations for transactions: every transaction t i effectively consumes exactly one dsid (which the user reveals), inducing an edge dsid → t i . If double-spending occurs, Trace may uncover the remainder token's dsid * produced by t i , in which case the graph would contain an edge t i → dsid * . Figure 2 depicts an example database DB.
Stores periodically send their observed transactions t i (together with their k, dsid, and dstag) to the central database. If dsid is not yet in the database, the database simply adds dsid → t i to the graph. If dsid was already in the database, then it has already been spent in a transaction t j . t i is marked invalid and Link, Trace are used to find t i 's successor dsid * . If dsid * is already in the database, any transaction descendants of dsid * are marked invalid and the process repeats. The exact algorithm DBsync(k, dsid, dstag, DB) to add a transaction t i to the graph is given in Figure 3 . 
t2 dsid3 t3 t3 dsid4 Figure 2 : Example DB. Double-struck spend operations are invalid. All dashed lines are added when t 2 is synchronized into DB. The user has double-spent dsid 1 (and t ′ 1 is marked invalid because of this). When t 2 is synchronized into DB, it is immediately marked invalid, dsid 3 is revealed to be its successor and as a consequence, t 3 is marked invalid and its successor dsid 4 is computed.
DBsync(k , dsid, dstag, D B):
• Add new spend operation node t i to D B, associate it with k , dstag.
• If dsid is not in D B, add the node dsid and an edge from dsid to t i .
• Otherwise, add the edge from dsid to t i , and:
-If dsid has no (upk, dslink) associated with it, then there exist two outgoing edges from dsid to transactions t i , t j . In this case, compute (upk, dslink) = Link(ispp, dstag ′ i , dstag ′ j ) using the two tags dstag ′ i , dstag ′ j associated with t i and t j , respectively. Associate (upk, dslink) with dsid.
-Mark t i invalid (this triggers the steps below). • Whenever some node t i with incoming edge from some dsid is marked invalid -Use (upk, dslink) associated with dsid and dstag associated to t i to compute dsid * = Trace(ispp, dslink, dstag). Add dsid * to the graph (if it does not already exist), associate (upk, dslink) with dsid * , and add an edge from t i to dsid * . If there is an edge from dsid * to some t j , mark t j invalid (if it was not already marked). This triggers this routine again.
Figure 3: DBsync algorithm
If desired, the provider can periodically send all or some spent dsids known in DB to the store terminals so that they can immediately reject future double-spending transactions. This is especially useful for dsid * s that were revealed through Trace and have not been spent yet (but we already know that they will ultimately be revealed as double-spending after the next database synchronization).
Formal definition
We now formally define incentive systems. For this, we define a set of oracles with shared state that formally represent the behavior of honest parties in the processes explained above. These oracles will allow us to the correctness and security definitions (we will allow an adversary A to query a selection of these oracles in subsequent security games). For these definitions, we assume that ispp has been generated honestly.
Honest users. To model honest users, we define the following oracles:
• Keygen() chooses a new user handle u, generates key pair (upk, usk) ← KeyGen(ispp), and stores for reference (upk u , usk u , v u , pk u , token u , dsid u ) ← (upk, usk, 0, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥). It outputs u, upk. • Join(u, pk) given handle u runs (token, dsid) ← Join(ispp, pk, upk u , usk u ). If token =⊥, the oracle outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it stores pk u ← pk, token u ← token, and dsid u ← dsid. This oracle can only be called once for each u. It must be called before any calls to Earn(u, ·) and Spend(u, ·). • Earn(u, k) given handle u and k ∈ N with v u + k ≤ v max , the oracle runs token * ← Earn(ispp, pk u , k, usk u , token u ).
If token * =⊥, the oracle outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it updates token u ← token * and v u ← v u + k.
• Spend(u, k) given handle u and k ∈ N with v u ≥ k, the oracle first sends dsid u to its communication partner and then runs (token * , dsid * ) ← Spend(ispp, pk u , k, dsid u , usk u , token u ). It updates token u ← token * , dsid u ← dsid * and v u ← v u − k. If token * =⊥, the oracle outputs ⊥ and all further calls to any oracles concerning u are ignored. 1 Honest Provider. To model an honest provider, we define the following oracles:
• IssuerKeyGen() generates (pk, sk) ← IssuerKeyGen(ispp). It stores pk and sk for further use. It initially sets the set of users U ← ∅ and sets the double-spend database DB to the empty graph. Furthermore, initially v earned , v spent ← 0. Further calls to this oracle are ignored. This oracle must be called before any of the other provider-related oracles. The oracle outputs pk. • Issue(upk) if upk ∈ U, the request is ignored. Otherwise, the oracle runs Issue(ispp, pk, upk, sk) and adds upk to U. • Credit(k) for k ∈ N, runs Credit(ispp, pk, k, sk) and sets value v earned ← v earned + k. • Deduct(k) for k ∈ N, waits to receive dsid. It then runs algorithm Deduct(ispp, pk, k, dsid, sk) → (b, dstag). If b = 0, it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it chooses a fresh spend handle s and stores (dsid s , dstag s , k s ) ← (dsid, dstag, k). Then it outputs s and increments v spent ← v spent + k.
Then, it updates DB ← DB ′ and recomputes v invalid as the sum of values k associated with invalid transactions within DB ′ .
Syntax and correctness. We are now prepared to define incentive systems and their correctness. For this, consider an experiment Exp correct (Π insy , A, λ), where A is an algorithm. The experiment first runs IssuerKeyGen to receive pk. The adversary A is then given pk and access to the following oracles (see Section 2 for oracle notation): Keygen(), u → Issue(upk u ) ↔ Join(u, pk), (u, k) → Earn(u, k) ↔ Credit(k), (u, k) → Spend(u, k) ↔ Deduct(k), and s → DBsync(s). The experiment outputs fail if something goes wrong, i.e. if one of the oracles outputs ⊥ or if DB contains a transaction marked as invalid. Note that in this experiment, all protocols are followed honestly and A effectively just chooses a polynomial-length sequence of actions that users or the provider take. 
Security Definitions of Incentive Systems
With regards to security, an incentive system should protect honest users' privacy. The provider wants to be sure that users cannot spend more points than the provider issued. If they do (e.g., in
ispp ← Setup(G(1 λ )) (pk, st) ← A(ispp) (u 0 , u 1 , k , st) ← A Keygen(),Join(·,pk),Earn(·,·),Spend(·,·) (st)
If ⊥∈ {token u 0 , token u 1 }, output 0 offline stores), the provider needs to be able to uncover all illegal transactions and prove the double-spending user's guilt. We will now define these properties formally.
6.3.1 Anonymity. For anonymity, we want that a malicious provider is unable to learn which user belongs to which earn/spend transaction. In reality, this protects users, for example, from having their shopping history linked to their identity. Users are not anonymous when registering for the incentive system (Join) because the provider needs to learn their real identity to identify double-spending users. However, if users are honest and do not double-spend, the provider should not be able to link a user's registration to any other action they do. More formally, a malicious provider should not be able to distinguish two users running the Earn or the Spend protocol. We define this with a game-based approach: we define two experiments, Exp ano-Earn and Exp ano-Spend , which treat anonymity for the Earn and Spend operation, respectively (cf. Figure 4 ). In the first phase of the experiments, the adversary A plays the role of a malicious provider: A publishes some public key pk and interacts with honest users. Note that by design of the honest user oracles, honest users never double-spend. A then chooses two users u 0 , u 1 . The experiment makes one of the users run Earn (or Spend) with A. A should not be able to distinguish u 0 running Earn (or Spend) from u 1 running the protocol.
There are two exceptions to this: First, if u 0 has a valid token token u 0 ⊥, while u 1 does not (e.g., because the provider sabotaged an earlier spend operation), then certainly u 0 can be distinguished from u 1 . Second, if u 0 or u 1 do not have sufficiently many points to spend k, or, analogously, if u 0 or u 1 has too many points to receive k additional points without hitting the v max limit. Since it is functionally desired to be able to distinguish users in these cases, the experiment accounts for this. Definition 6.2 (Anonymity). The experiment Exp ano-X is presented in Fig. 4 and defined for X ∈ {Earn, Spend}. We say that an incentive system Π insy is anonymous if for both X ∈ {Earn, Spend} and for all ppt A it holds that ispp ← Setup(G(1 λ )) (pk, st) ← A(ispp) (u, dslink) ← A Keygen(),Join(·,pk),Earn(·,·),Spend(·,·) (st)
If VrfyDs(ispp, dslink, upk u ) = 1 output 1
Else output 0 Figure 5 : Framing resistance experiment 6.3.2 Framing resistance. To deal with double-spending users, the provider wants to be able to convincingly accuse users of doublespending. Framing resistance guarantees that honest users cannot be falsely accused of double-spending by a malicious provider. This is a positive for honest users (as they can repudiate double-spending claims) and for the provider (a double-spending proof holds more weight in court if the provider cannot possibly frame innocent users). We define framing resistance with an experiment, in which the adversary A plays the role of a malicious provider, who publishes some pk and interacts with honest users (which by definition do not double-spend). Ultimately, A tries to compute a value dslink that is accepted by VrfyDs as proof of double-spending for some honest user. The chances of him succeeding must be negligible. Definition 6.3 (Framing resistance). We define experiment Exp fram-res in Fig. 5 . We say that incentive system Π insy is framing resistant if for all ppt A, there exists a negligible function negl s.t. Pr[Exp fram-res (Π, A, λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ) for all λ. ⋄ 6.3.3 Soundness. For soundness, we ideally want to ensure that malicious users cannot spend more points than the honest provider has issued. Of course, in the presence of offline double-spending, this statement cannot be true: users can certainly spend their tokens twice in offline stores. Hence we need to be more precise. We keep count of three kinds of points (as can be seen in the oracle definitions on page 10): v earned counts how many points the provider has issued. v spent counts how many points users have spent (in the sense of successful Deduct runs). v invalid counts how many points were spent in transactions that have been marked invalid in the provider's database DB. Soundness will guarantee that v spent − v invalid ≤ v earned , i.e. users cannot spend more then they have earned if you deduct transactions the provider discovers to be invalid. This means that while users may be able to double-spend, they cannot do so undetected. Furthermore, soundness guarantees that double-spending transactions can be traced to users, i.e. whenever DB contains some upk, dslink annotated to some double-spent token node dsid, then upk is one of the registered users and dslink is valid proof of doublespending.
The experiment has an adversary A play the role of an arbitrary number of malicious users, while the experiment simulates an honest provider. A can interact with the honest provider for the usual user operations. Additionally, A can control the order in which his transaction data is added to the central database DB. A wins if either v spent − v invalid > v earned (even though all transactions have Exp sound (Π insy , A, λ):
pk ← IssuerKeyGen() Run A Issue(·),Credit(·),Deduct(·),DBsync(·) (ispp, pk) Definition 6.4 (Soundness). We define Exp sound in Fiд. 6. We say that incentive system Π insy is sound if for all ppt A, there exists a negligible function negl with Pr[Exp sound (Π, A, λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ) for all λ. ⋄
CONSTRUCTION OF AN INCENTIVE SYSTEM FROM UACS
For our construction of an incentive system, we use a UACS Π uacs (as in Definition 3.1), a public-key encryption scheme Π enc (as in Definition 2.2), and an additively malleable commitment scheme Π cmt (as in Definition 2.3). At its core, the users' tokens will be credentials encoding their points. They are updated whenever the user earns or spends points. Most of the other mechanisms in place deal with double-spending prevention, as we'll explain below.
Key generation. The system is set up using Setup(pp), which outputs ispp = (pp, cpp, pk cmt ) consisting of public parameters pp (e.g., the elliptic curve group), credential public parameters cpp ← Setup uacs (pp), and a commitment key pk cmt ← KeyGen cmt (pp). pp fixes an attribute space A for the credential system and a message space M enc for the encryption scheme. We assume A = Z p for some super-poly p and set the point maximum to v max = p − 1.
The key pair (pk, sk) ← IssuerKeyGen(ispp) for a provider is simply a credential key pair (pk, sk) ← IssuerKeyGen uacs (cpp, 1 n ) for n = 4 (i.e. all our attribute vectors will have length 4). They will use sk to issue and update credentials.
Users generate a key pair (upk, usk) ← KeyGen(ispp), which is simply an encryption key pair, i.e. usk ← KeyGen enc (pp) and upk = ComputePK enc (pp, usk). As a rough idea, the user's key will be used to (1) identify the user, and (2) encrypt tracing data. If double-spending occurs, our mechanisms will ensure that usk is revealed, allowing the provider to access the tracing data.
Obtaining a token. A token token = (dsid, dsrnd, v, cred) consists of its identifier dsid, some randomness dsrnd used for doublespending protection, its current value v, and a credential cred with attributes (usk, dsid, dsrnd, v).
The provider wants the dsid for each token to be uniformly random, so that users cannot maliciously provoke dsid collisions (which, at first glance, would not actually benefit the user. However, dsid collisions between otherwise unrelated tokens would hinder tracing). Furthermore, the provider should not be able to learn dsid, because he would otherwise be able to recognize the user when he spends the token and reveals dsid. For this reason, the first step of the token-obtaining protocol Issue(ispp, pk, upk, sk) ↔ Join(ispp, pk, upk, usk) → (token, dsid) has the user and provider compute a commitment to dsid such that dsid is guaranteed to be uniformly random in Z p if either the user or the provider is honest, and only the user knows dsid. To ensure this, both parties contribute a random share for dsid. The user privately picks a random share dsid usr ← Z p , and the provider does the same for his share dsid prvdr ← Z p . Then the user commits to his share (C usr , open) ← Commit cmt (pp, pk cmt , dsid usr ) and sends the commitment C usr to the provider. The provider replies with his share dsid prvdr ← Z p (in plain). Using additive malleability of the commitment scheme, both parties can compute the commitment C dsid = Add cmt (pp, pk cmt , C usr , dsid prvdr ) to dsid := dsid usr + dsid prvdr . Intuitively, if the provider is honest, then dsid prvdr is uniformly random, and hence dsid is random. If the user is honest, dsid usr is uniformly random and hidden within the commitment, so the provider will not be able to choose dsid prvdr adaptively, hence overall, dsid in that case should also be uniformly random (and hidden from the provider). Now the provider issues a credential to the user. For this, the user's hidden parameter is α = (usk, dsid, dsrnd, open), where the user privately chooses dsrnd ← Z p . The update function is
where ψ chk is true if and only if • The user secret to be written into the credential is consistent with the user's public key (upk = ComputePK enc (pp, usk)), and • dsid is committed (Vrfy cmt (pp, pk cmt , C dsid , dsid, open) = 1).
The two parties run Issue uacs (cpp, pk,ψ , sk) ↔ Receive uacs (cpp, pk,ψ , α) → cred, where the user receives his credential cred. The user outputs his token token = (dsid, dsrnd, v = 0, cred).
Earning points. The two-party protocol Credit(ispp, pk, k, sk) ↔ Earn(ispp, pk, k, usk, token), where the user receives a new token token * with value v + k is very simple: the provider and the user simply run a credential update that adds k to v, i.e. with update function ψ ((usk, dsid, dsrnd, v), ·) = (usk, dsid, dsrnd, v + k). The user stores the new token token * = (dsid, dsrnd, v +k, cred * ), where cred * is the result of the credential update.
Spending points. Spending k ≤ v points of a token token = (dsid, dsrnd, v, cred) is the most complicated operation, as most of the double-spending protection happens here. Before the protocol, the user reveals dsid, which (with overwhelming probability) uniquely identifies token. Then, the parties run Spend(ispp, pk, k, dsid, usk, token) ↔ Deduct(ispp, pk, k, dsid, sk), which works as follows:
For the remainder token, the user and the provider jointly compute a commitment C dsid * on a guaranteed random dsid * as in the "Obtaining a token" protocol. From this, the user obtains C dsid * ,
dsid * , open * and the provider obtains C dsid * .
To enable the provider to reveal the user's identity in case of double-spending, the provider sends a random challenge γ ← Z p to the user and the user replies with c = usk ·γ + dsrnd (using dsrnd of the token he's spending). Intuitively, if this is the first time this token is spent, dsrnd is uniformly random and the provider has never seen the value, hence to the provider, c is just some uniformly random value. The idea is that if the user tries to spend the same token a second time, he will be forced to reveal c ′ = usk ·γ ′ + dsrnd for some (likely different) challenge γ ′ , from which the provider would be able to compute usk = (c −c ′ )/(γ −γ ′ ), clearly identifying the user.
In case the user double-spends, the provider needs to be able to find the dsid * of the remainder token that is going to be issued. To enable this, the user encrypts dsid * under his own public key: ctrace ← Encrypt enc (pp, upk, dsid * ) and sends ctrace to the provider. The idea is that if usk is ever revealed because the user double-spends, then the provider can use it to decrypt ctrace and uncover the remainder token's identifier dsid * .
Finally, user and provider run a credential update on the user's current token to become the remainder token. This includes a check whether or not the data sent by the user is formed correctly. The user's hidden parameter is α = (dsid * , dsrnd * , open * ), where dsid * , and open * are as above and the user secretly chooses dsrnd * ← Z p . The update function is
where ψ chk is true if and only if
• dsid in the credential is the same as the user has revealed to the provider, • the user has sufficient points, i.e. v ≥ k, • the commitment to dsid * is well-formed, i.e. 1 = Vrfy cmt (pp, pk cmt , C dsid * , dsid * , open * ), • c is well-formed to reveal usk upon double-spending, i.e. c = usk · γ + dsrnd, and • ctrace can be decrypted with usk, i.e. dsid * = Decrypt enc (pp, usk, ctrace).
From the credential update, the user receives a credential cred * . If cred * ⊥, Spend outputs token * = (dsid * , dsrnd * , v − k, cred * ) and its dsid * . The provider receives a bit b from the update, intuitively indicating whether or not the user had sufficient points and that the data he sent will enable correct tracing of the user and this transaction. Deduct outputs b and, if b = 1, the double-spending tag dstag = (c, γ , ctrace).
Handling offline double-spending. The double-spending of a user and their dsid can be traced as follows:
For two tags dstag = (c, γ , ctrace = usk · γ + dsrnd) and dstag ′ = (c ′ , γ ′ , ctrace ′ = usk · γ ′ + dsrnd), we can compute Link(ispp, dstag, dstag ′ ) = (upk, dslink) as dslink = usk = (c − c ′ )/(γ − γ ′ ), and upk = ComputePK(pp, dslink). Then, dslink can be used to trace that user's transactions by decrypting ctrace as Trace(ispp, dslink, dstag) := Decrypt enc (pp, dslink, ctrace) = dsid * .
Finally, clearly we can establish a user's guilt by revealing the secret key usk = dslink to his public key upk. To verify a user's key, VrfyDs(ispp, dslink, upk) checks that ComputePK(pp, dslink) = upk.
Correctness. A more compact representation of this construction can be found in Appendix C. It is easy to check correctness given that dsids are by definition uniformly random in Z p if both user and provider behave honestly.
Security
We state the following theorems: The proofs of these theorems are presented in the full version of this paper [5] .
INSTANTIATION AND PERFORMANCE OF OUR INCENTIVE SYSTEM
We instantiated Construction C.1 using the signature scheme by Pointcheval and Sanders [23] for the UACS, and ElGamal as the public-key encryption scheme and malleable commitment. A concrete description of the instantiated scheme can be found in the full version [5] . Using the open-source Java library upb.crypto and the bilinear group provided by mcl (bn256) 2 we implemented this instantiation and ran it on a phone (typical user device) and a laptop (approximate provider device). In Table 1 we focus on the execution time (in ms) of the protocols, excluding communication cost. The numbers illustrate that our scheme is practical. They are better or comparable to the BBA+ performance [18] , who do not offer partial spending (the user needs to reveal point count when spending) and hence can avoid expensive range proofs. 
A SECURITY DEFINITIONS FOR BUILDING BLOCKS
Definition A.1 (Unforgeability). Consider the following unforgeability game Exp blind-uf (Π, A, λ) for a blind signature scheme Π:
• The experiment runs pp ← G(1 λ ) and hands pp to A. A responds with 1 n for some n ∈ N. The experiment generates (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(pp, 1 n ) and hands pk to A. • A can query signatures by announcing c, ì m ∈ M n and r such that c = Commit(pp, pk, ì m, r ). The experiment then runs BlindSign(pp, pk, sk, c) interacting with A and records ì m. • Eventually, A outputs ì m * and σ * . The experiment outputs 1 iff Vrfy(pp, pk, ì m * , σ * ) = 1 and ì m * was not recorded in any query. Π has blind unforgeability if for all ppt A there exists negl such that Pr[Exp blind-uf (Π, A, λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ) for all λ. ⋄ Definition A.2 (Perfect msg privacy). We say that a blind signature scheme has perfect message privacy if
• "the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding": For all ì m 0 , ì m 1 ∈ M n , Commit(pp, pk, ì m 0 , r 0 ) is distributed exactly the same as Commit(pp, pk, ì m 1 , r 1 ) over the random choice of r 0 , r 1 . • "BlindRcv does not reveal the message": for any two messages ì m 0 , ì m 1 ∈ M n and all (unrestricted) A:
(output A [A(C 0 ) ↔ BlindRcv(pp, pk, ì m 0 , r 0 )], χ 0 )
is distributed exactly like (output A [A(C 1 ) ↔ BlindRcv(pp, pk, ì m 1 , r 1 )], χ 1 )
where r 0 , r 1 is chosen uniformly at random, C j = Commit(pp, pk, ì m j , r j ) and χ j is an indicator variable with χ j = 1 if and only if Vrfy(pp, pk, ì m j , σ j ) = 1 for the local output σ j of BlindRcv in either case. ⋄ While this definition may seem strong, it is satisfied, for example, by the Pointcheval Sanders blind signature scheme [23] , where Commit is a effectively a (perfectly hiding) Pedersen commitment, Their BlindRcv (in our formulation without zero-knowledge proof) does not send any messages (meaning the output of A is clearly independent of ì m), and the χ j bit (validity of the resulting signature) is also independent of the committed message. • The experiment generates public parameters pp ← G(1 λ ) and two keys KeyGen enc (pp) → sk 0 , sk 1 , hands A the pp and the two public keys (pk 0 , pk 1 ) = (ComputePK enc (pp, sk 0 ), ComputePK enc (pp, sk 1 )).
• A outputs two messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ M pp .
• A gets Encrypt enc (pp, pk b , m b ) from the experiment and outputs a bitb. We say that Π enc is key-ind. CPA secure if for all ppt A, there exists a negligible function negl s.t. Let Π sig be a blind signature (Definition 2.1). We construct UACS: Setup(pp) → cpp generates public parameters cpp consisting of pp and a zero-knowledge argument common reference string. The attribute space A is equal to the signature scheme's message space M sig . IssuerKeyGen(cpp, 1 n ) → (pk, sk) generates keys by running algorithm KeyGen sig (pp, 1 n ) → (pk, sk). The update function universe Ψ consists of allψ : (M n sig ∪{⊥})×{0, 1} * → M n sig ∪{⊥} that are supported by the zero-knowledge arguments below. Issue(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) ↔ Receive(cpp, pk,ψ , α) → cred for ψ ∈ Ψ works as follows:
• The receiver computes ì A = ψ (⊥, α) and commits to ì A by computing c = Commit sig (pp, pk, ì A, r ) for random r and sends c to the issuer.
• Receiver proves ZKAK[(α, r ); c = Commit sig (pp, pk,ψ (⊥ , α), r )] • If the proof accepts, issuer runs BlindSign sig (pp, pk, sk, c) and receiver runs BlindRcv sig (pp, pk, ì A, r ) → σ . • The receiver checks if Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì A, σ ) = 1. If so, it outputs cred = ( ì A, σ ), otherwise it outputs ⊥. b ← Update(cpp, pk,ψ , sk) ↔ UpdRcv(cpp, pk,ψ , α, cred) → cred * works as follows:
• The receiver parses cred = ( ì A, σ ) and then computes ì A * = ψ ( ì A, α). • The receiver commits to ì A * by computing the commitment c = Commit sig (pp, pk, ì A * , r ) for random r and sends c to the issuer. • Then, the receiver proves ZKAK[( ì A, σ, α, r ); Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì A, σ ) = 1 ∧ c = Commit sig (pp, pk,ψ ( ì A, α), r )].
• If the proof rejects, the issuer outputs 0 and aborts.
• Otherwise, issuer runs BlindSign sig (pp, pk, sk, c) while receiver runs BlindRcv sig (pp, pk, ì A * , r ) → σ * . • The receiver checks if Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì A * , σ * ) = 1. If so, it outputs cred * = ( ì A * , σ * ), otherwise it outputs ⊥. The issuer outputs 1. ShowPrv(cpp, pk, ϕ, α, cred) ↔ ShowVrfy(cpp, pk, ϕ) → b behaves as follows: the prover parses cred = ( ì A, σ ). If ϕ( ì A, α) = 0, the prover aborts and the verifier outputs 0. Otherwise, the prover runs the proof ZKAK[( ì A, α, σ ); Vrfy sig (pp, pk, ì A, σ ) = 1 ∧ ϕ( ì A, α) = 1]. If the proof succeeds, the verifier outputs 1, otherwise 0.
